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BOOK REVIEW
CONVICTION. THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL. By Donald J. Newman. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966. Pp.
xxvii, 259. $8.50.
Until very recently, not many people seemed willing to think hard about
the common practice of plea bargaining. Doubts as to its propriety, let
alone legality, combined with the widespread belief that the practice is
an administrative necessity, have certainly not created an atmosphere con-
ducive to careful consideration of the practice. Just recently, for example,
an eminent scholar of the criminal law privately expressed this common
view. Upon being told that the National Crime Commission was devoting
considerable attention to the problems of plea bargaining, he commented
"What's the point; we have no choice but to live with the practice any-
way."
This conspiracy of silence seems to dominate even those courts which
inquire into the voluntariness of tendered guilty pleas. These judges typi-
cally ask the defendant whether he has been offered any inducements for
his guilty plea. Some judges specifically inquire whether anyone has
promised the defendant leniency in return for his plea. We may infer that
affirmative answers would result in rejection of the plea or at least further
judicial inquiry. Such further inquiry is avoided, however, by negative
answers to these questions. This is true despite a background of discussions
and negotiations between the prosecutor and defense counsel, sometimes
even involving the judge. The judge then inquires whether the defendant
is pleading guilty because he is in fact guilty, the defendant replies affirma-
tively, and the plea is accepted.
There is a studied ambiguity in these questions which leaves room for
evasive maneuvering. After all, agreement to accept a plea to a lesser
included offense which carries a much lower maximum sentence than the
original charge (or does not carry a mandatory minimum sentence as does
the original charge) is not quite exactly a "promise of leniency." And
while a bargain may have been struck before the plea was tendered, the use
of terms such as "inducement" and "because" leave the legal mind the
"out" that the assurance of leniency was not the sole cause of the plea.
In other words, the questions asked use legal terms of art so that they call
for and beget conclusory replies which conceal the negotiations, arrange-
ments, and understandings which lie beneath the surface. Again, the fear
that we are confronted solely with the extreme alternatives of ignoring the
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practice and living with it, or throwing it out and collapsing under the
administrative burden, has prevented us from making a closer examination
of the practice and distinguishing proper plea bargains from the unaccept-
able.
Normally, our system relies on the defendant's self-interest to challenge
questionable practices. But in plea bargaining, the defendant's self-interest
usually lies in accepting the results of the bargain. Occasionally, however,
this is not so. A promise may not be kept, or what was described to the
defendant as a good chance for leniency may have been innocently or
cynically understood by him as a firm promise. Even when the promise
is kept, the defendant may have second thoughts. Once in jail, the prospect
of two years less to serve may not, after all, seem to have been worth giving
up his chances of an acquittal. And that's where the trouble begins.
Should the judge believe the defendant's claim after he has stated on the
record that no promises were made to him? Should the judge cast doubt
on the accuracy of the record underlying all those other guilty pleas? A
glance through almost any volume of the Federal Reporter will disclose
several cases involving attacks on bargained guilty pleas. Almost all of
the cases affirm the lower courts' decisions rejecting such contentions for
lack of credibility. Undoubtedly many more such lower court decisions go
unappealed and therefore unreported.
Uncredited disappointment is only one potential problem. When the
judge does not pierce this conspiracy of silence, who protects the public
interest to make sure that the defendant receives an appropriate sentence?
When the bargain results in the reduction of charges, the judge is de-
prived of his power to impose a heavier sentence. Even when the judge's
power is not so restricted, the parties' interest in a quick disposition of the
case may result in inadequate social investigation prior to sentencing and
a sentence that does not meet the underlying problems which are present
but undiscovered.
There is nothing terribly new in these musings. Judges who preside in
courts where plea bargaining is practical must be disturbed by similar
thoughts occasionally. But, fearing that to open the issue would lead to
the disqualification of all guilty pleas obtained in a bargaining context,
with awesome administrative consequences, discretion overcomes virtue.
The great merit of Professor Newman's volume is that it is a book whose
time is ripe. In the current atmosphere of criminal law reform, the prob-
lems presented by plea bargaining can no longer be avoided. Professor
Newman and the American Bar Foundation have furnished us with a
thorough and detailed description of the varieties of.plea bargaining. And
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if there is now danger that overzealous reform may demand the abolition
of all forms of plea bargaining,' Professor Newman has forcefully reminded
us of the need for a discriminating approach to reflect the diversity in
practice, that there are different types of plea bargains serving different
purposes in our system, and that the problems posed and the techniques
of control are similarly varied.2
On the other hand, the book has some flaws, the least significant of
which is a high degree of repetition. For example, the relationship be-
tween bargaining practices and the jurisdiction's sentencing structure, no
longer a novel idea,' is pointed out at least four times.' A more serious
problem is the lack of clarity as to the extent to which the author's re-
marks report, or at least are based on, actual field observation as dis-
tinguished from speculation and impressions gained from reading reported
judicial decisions. While such ambiguity occasionally inheres in the sub-
ject matter under consideration, such as in discussions of the motives of the
participants in the process, it is not limited to such instances. And, finally,
much of the information is simply inadequate to help us evaluate present
practices.
Two examples may illustrate these remarks. The relevance of multiple
offender statutes to plea bargaining is twice mentioned briefly but this
reader emerged with no picture of the impact of such statutes. One
reference,5 seemingly based on observed negotiations, does not clearly indi-
cate whether the prosecutors used such statutes to exert pressure on
defendants to plead guilty or whether the statutes were merely part of the
background picture which defense counsel had to consider. The distinction
may be important, for example, in arriving at a conclusion as to the extent
to which we can rely on the prosecutor and defense counsel to administer
the guilty plea process 4 In context, the impression gained is that the
prosecutors did not commonly manipulate such statutes to obtain guilty
pleas. On the other hand, the second reference strongly suggests that "it
1. Cf. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YAL L.J.
1, 17-19 (1932).
2. The book also contains a clear presentation of the central role of the trial judge
in the administration of criminal justice, and an excellent discussion of the role of
counsel and the problems faced by counsel assigned to the indigent.
3. E.g., Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effects Upon Systems for the
Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEIP. PRcO. 495 (1958).
4. Pp. 54-60, parts of chapters 6 and 8, and most of chapter 13. [All citations are to
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL (1966).]
5. P. 84.
6. The matter, of course, is also of concern to the administration of multiple-offender
statutes.
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is not an uncommon practice ' for prosecutors so to pressure defendants.
But the only example given is drawn from a reported judicial decision.
Similarly, with respect to the danger referred to above that bargaining may
result in inadequate response to serious crimes, we are advised only in the
most general terms that a practice of charge reduction that begins as a
discretionary device to individualize sentences often "becomes virtually
routine."'
Elsewhere, with considerable assistance from this volume,' I have at-
tempted a theoretical analysis of plea bargaining, contrasting the risks and
opportunities it presents, and suggesting those still unanswered questions
which one must ask in evaluating the process. Perhaps one should not be
surprised that initial attempts at empirical study should have emerged
stronger on the theoretical side than in providing an adequate informa-
tional base for future decision-making. Still, it is important to bear in mind
that we do not yet have adequate answers to the questions this volume
forces us to ask. Conviction furnishes a firm framework for future re-
search and discussion of the problems it explores. While such discussion
will hardly end with this book, it will undoubtedly begin here.
ARNOLD ENKERt
7. P. 58 n.3.
8. P. 182; cf. pp. 103-04.
9. The paper, entitled "Perspectives on Plea Bargaining," will appear in an Appendix
to the REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENNFORCEMENT AND An-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Visiting Professor of Law, The Hebrew
University, Jerusalem, 1966-67.
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